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Abstract
There is a desire for future GPS satellites to be software-defined to enable greater
operational flexibility and adapt to a variety of current and future threats. This
includes implementing new modulation techniques such as phase optimized constant
envelope transmission (POCET) and asymmetric signal authentication methods such
as chips message robust authentication (Chimera). Any new GPS signal transmitted
must be backwards compatible with the millions of receivers already in use. This
thesis shows a variety of tests performed to demonstrate the effects of Chimera and
POCET-enabled signals. It is shown through actual radio frequency signal generation,
testing the response of current-generation high accuracy commercial off-the-shelf GPS
receivers to these signals, that both Chimera and POCET, as implemented in a GPS
signal constellation, are backwards compatible.
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ANALYSIS OF SATELLITE TIMING AND NAVIGATION RECEIVER
PSEUDORANGE BIASES DUE TO CODE PUNCTURING AND PHASE
OPTIMIZED CONSTANT ENVELOPE TRANSMISSION
I. Introduction
The Navigation Satellite Timing and Ranging (NAVSTAR) Global Positioning
System (GPS), now referred to as Global Positioning System (GPS), was initially
developed by the United States Air Force in the 1970s for use by the United States
(US) Department of Defense. Its goal was to provide accurate timing and position
information to military platforms anywhere in the world at all times and in all weather
conditions. Development and launch of the GPS satellites, it has revolutionized US
military operations and enabled game-changing technologies such as precision guided
munitions, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and personnel and equipment tracking.
While the original intent was for United States military operations, GPS has
greatly benefited civilian users. Civilian use of GPS has increased dramatically since
the deactivation of selective availability (SA) in May of 2000, enabling users to know
their position with meter-level accuracy. This sparked rapid commercial development,
and GPS receivers are now used for a variety of purposes such as personal hand-
held electronic device navigation, surveying, tracking of cargo and freight vehicles,
atmospheric measurements, real time kinematic (RTK) positioning, and precise point
positioning (PPP).
The accurate worldwide timing capability that civilian GPS receivers provide is
essential to critical infrastructure including the synchronization of power grids, cellu-
lar base-stations and global financial transactions. Safety-of-life applications that rely
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on GPS include airplane autopilot, coordinating aviation operations though all phases
of flight [3], self-driving vehicles, mining, construction, search and rescue operations,
and disaster relief.
One of the most recent civilian GPS technology advancement is the recent devel-
opment of dual frequency GPS receivers on a single chip for cellular phone and other
mass market applications [4]. This will enable ubiquitous cm-level positioning ac-
curacy, providing lane discrimination for navigation platforms and greatly improved
multipath mitigation in urban canyons. This demonstrates that high precision GPS
technology is only going to increase in scope, and underlines the need for authentica-
tion, verification, and trust in civilian GPS technology.
It is obvious that GPS is an integral part of both the US military operations and
civilian critical infrastructure and industry. Therefore it is essential to continue to
provide high-fidelity position and timing capabilities to the United States’ military
and civilian interests across the globe. To further improve civilian GPS performance
and interoperability with other Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS), a new
L1C signal was added to enable more accurate single-frequency civilian receivers and
reduce dependence on the legacy coarse acquisition (C/A) signal [5]. The most re-
cent $583 million [6] GPS Block III space vehicle (SV) launched in December 2018
transmits the new L1C signal.
Previous GPS satellites have relied on signal-specific specialized hardware to mod-
ulate navigation signals. While they provide precisely the specific signal characteris-
tics as designed, the transmitted signals cannot be fundamentally changed over the
several-decade lifespan of the satellite. There is a desire for future satellite payloads
to be software-defined, in order to enable flexibility in the improved signals as sig-
nal technology and threats evolve over the lifespan of the satellite. This reduces the
cost of rapidly adding new signal technology as software-defined payloads can per-
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form the required mission and remain in orbit for decades instead of launching new
dedicated-hardware payloads that might become obsolete after several years.
These next-generation software-defined payloads could support a variety of in-
novative algorithms to improve military and civilian GPS performance. One such
algorithm is Chips Message Robust Authentication (Chimera), which provides GPS
signal authentication to civilian users via an asymmetric encryption scheme [1]. Cur-
rently civilian GPS signals are unencrypted, which exposse critical infrastructure to
malicious or unintentional spoofers. Spoofing is the transmission of navigation sig-
nals meant to confuse a receiver to output measurements as if it were in a different
position or time. Sadly, with the prevalence of Software-Defined Radios (SDRs) and
civilian signal generation software readily available online, those with little technical
ability and access to low cost off-the-shelf hardware can reportedly spoof receivers
[7]. While there are a variety of ways to detect some spoofers via receiver integrity
monitoring [8], these techniques do not satisfy the requirements for cryptographically
assured trust and signal authenticity that Chimera provides. Software-defined pay-
loads provide a way to implement the Chimera algorithm by digitally watermarking
the civilian signals.
Another next-generation algorithm fully enabled by software-defined payloads is
Phase Optimized Constant Envelope Transmission (POCET) [9]. It is a technique
to modulate a variety of navigation signals on the same carrier while maintaining a
constant envelope required for efficient power utilization in a satellite. POCET also
enables flex-power, a technique where power can dynamically be adjusted between
various military and civilian signals to enable greater operational flexibility.
Before fielding any new or modified GPS signal, it is essential to determine if
there are any negative effects on existing receivers. While in theory neither Chimera or
POCET would cause undesired distortions or biases on ideal receivers, testing on non-
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participating, current-generation commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) receivers has not
yet been performed. Many civilian COTS receivers use proprietary demodulation and
tracking techniques such as advanced multipath mitigation algorithms. Because these
proprietary techniques are not well understood or characterized, it is possible that
Chimera and/or POCET could induce range measurement biases in these receivers.
Therefore an essential part of the advanced signals development phase must include
compatibility testing on various representative COTS receivers to ensure that these
new signals do no harm to the installed base of millions of GPS receivers currently
used in industry and national critical infrastructure.
The goals of this research are as follows:
• Perform data collections from COTS receivers tracking prototype POCET and
Chimera-enabled signals.
• Analyze these data to determine if these next generation signals have unforeseen
or negative effects on non-participating receivers.
• For any biases or effects revealed in data analysis, determine their cause(s) and
investigate potential solutions in pursuit of demonstrating backwards compati-
bility.
This thesis presents the first known analysis of the effects of Chimera and POCET-
enabled signals on COTS GPS receivers and is organized as follows: Chapter 2 pro-
vides the technical background for this research and explains concepts and algorithms
essential to this research including GPS signal generation and tracking fundamentals,
digital signal generation architectures, puncturing as applied to civilian signal authen-
tication using Chimera, constant envelope modulation (CEM) techniques (specifically
POCET), and receiver biases in the correlation function and chip shape domain.
Chapter 3 describes the testing methodology and effects of puncturing spreading
4
codes on COTS receivers. Chapter 4 then presents the testing methodology and
performance results of COTS receivers and software-defined receivers using POCET
modulation. Finally, Chapter 5 summarizes the results and contributions of this re-
search as they pertain to the goals described above and proposes directions for future
work.
5
II. Background
This chapter provides the technical background necessary to understand the method-
ology and experiments performed in the remaining chapters.
2.1 Satellite Navigation Signal Fundamentals
Satellite timing and Navigation (SatNav) systems, or if world-wide, Global Nav-
igation Satellite Systems (GNSS) rely on a constellation of satellites orbiting the
earth known as Space Vehicles (SVs), which transmit navigation signals in order for
a SatNav receiver to be able to calculate its position, velocity, and time (PVT).
Global Positioning System Signal Constellation.
The United State’s Global Positioning System (GPS) currently transmits naviga-
tion signals at three different carrier frequencies: the Link-1 (L1) band at 1575.42
MHz, the L2 band at 1227.60 MHz, and the L5 band at 1176.45 MHz. The cur-
rent signals modulated onto the GPS L1 carrier frequency are shown in Table 1 [10]
[5]. The different signal characteristics listed are explained in the remainder of this
chapter.
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Table 1. GPS L1 Band (fc = 1575.42 MHz) Signals [2]
GPS L1
Signal
C/A P(Y) L1Cp (Pilot)
L1Cd
(Data)
M-code
Modulation
BPSK-
R(1)
BPSK-
R(10)
TMBOC(6,1,4/33) BOC(1,1) BOC(10,5)
Sub-carrier
Frequency
(MHz)
- - 1.023 & 6.138 1.023 10.23
Code Fre-
quency
(MHz)
1.023 10.23 1.023 1.023 5.115
Primary
PRN Code
Length
1023 6.19(1012) 10230 10230 Unpublished
Secondary
PRN
(Over-
lay) Code
Length
- - 1800 - Unpublished
Code Fam-
ily
Gold
Codes
M-
sequences
Weil Codes
Weil
Codes
Unpublished
Data Rate
50 bps /
50 sps
50 bps /
50 sps
-
50 bps /
100 sps
Unpublished
Minimum
Received
Power
(dBW)
-158.5 -161.5 -163 -158.25 Unpublished
7
The different component signals in the L1 band are modulated using spreading
codes, a pseudorandom binary sequence for a given signal that gives it the desired
spectral shape. In order for a receiver to be able to distinguish between the signals
generated by different GPS satellites, each satellite has a unique Pseudo-Random
Number (PRN) sequence for each signal, enabling Code Division Multiple Access
(CDMA). Data is also modulated onto these spreading codes, but the data rate,
typically about 50 bits/sec (bps) and 50-100 symbols/sec (sps), does not significantly
affect the spectrum of a given signal. The GPS L1 Spectrum is shown in Figure
1. The L1Cp, L1Cd, P(Y), and M-code signals are modulated in-phase, while the
C/A signal is modulated in quadrature-phase. The signals with lower code frequency
(C/A, L1Cp, L1Cd) have a smaller bandwidth than the signals with a higher code
frequency (P(Y), M-code). Additionally, the presence of sub-carriers in the L1Cp,
L1Cd, and M-code signals shift power away from the carrier frequency.
Figure 1. GPS L1 Signals Power Spectral Densities
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Binary Phase Shift Keying Modulation.
The legacy course-acquisition (C/A) signal, currently used for civilian GPS re-
ceivers, uses Binary Phase Shift Keying (BPSK) modulation. The binary values of
the spreading code b[n] (chips) result in the modulation of one of two different phases
onto the carrier frequency,
BPSK(t) = Acos(ωt+ πb[n]). (1)
The power spectral density (PSD) envelope of a generic BPSK signal, assuming
infinitely-long random sequences as a function of code frequency (or chipping rate)
fc is given by [11]
GBPSK(fc) = fc
sin2
(
πf
fc
)
(πf)2
. (2)
The C/A signal uses 1023-length Gold Codes for spreading codes, which have
the property that the autocorrelation values for any chip offset of a given C/A PRN
sequence is either 1023, 63, -1, -65. Given the rate and length shown in Table 1, the
C/A spreading codes repeat every 1 ms. This enables a receiver to acquire and track
the signal quickly.
The argument of BPSK-R(n) notation represents code rate expressed as a multiple
of the fundamental code frequency fc of 1.023 MChips/s. The “R” denotes that
rectangular chips are used, as opposed to other chip shapes (i.e. a square wave) [12].
The BPSK modulation for C/A is BPSK-R(1), while the military legacy encrypted
precise signal P(Y) uses BPSK-R(10) modulation, since the code frequency fc = 10.23
MChips/s.
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Binary Offset Carrier Modulation.
The L1 Civilian (L1C) and Military (M) signals use Binary Offset Carrier (BOC)
modulation [13]. The notation for this modulation is BOC(m,n), where the frequency
of the subcarrier is fsc = m×1.023 MHz, and the spreading code chipping rate is
fc = n × 1.023 MHz. Since the legacy C/A and P(Y) signals are modulated using
BPSK with a high power density at the center of the band, BOC shifts power away
from the center by +fsc and −fsc, as shown in Figure 1.
The time domain representation of sin BOC is [14]
BOCsin(t) = c(t)sign[sin(2πfsct)] (3)
with
c(t) =
∑
k
ckh(t− kTc) (4)
where ck is the code sequence waveform, fsc is the subcarrier frequency, and h(t) is
the Non Return to Zero (NRZ) code materialization with value 1 over support [0, Tc)
[13].
The frequency-domain representation of sin BOC for the general BOC(m,n) case
is
GBOCsin(fsc, fc) = fc
sin
(
πf
fc
)
sin
(
πf
2fsc
)
πfcos
(
πf
2fsc
)
2 . (5)
The L1C signal has two components, the pilot (L1Cp) and data (L1Cd) [5]. The
L1Cd signal is modulated with BOC(1,1), and has navigation data modulated onto
it. The L1Cp signal does not have data modulated onto it, which means that it can
be coherently integrated for longer periods of time, without having to account for
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data bit transitions. However, there is a secondary 1800-symbol overlay code that
is used to frame the L1Cd subframe, and also helps to minimize cross correlation.
Additionally, there is a BOC(6,1) component to the L1Cp signal, which results in
higher frequency component which is beneficial to high precision civilian receivers.
The BOC(6,1) and BOC(1,1) components of the L1Cp are combined via time division,
resulting in a Time-Multiplexed BOC (TMBOC) signal known as TMBOC(6,1,4/33),
meaning that every 4 of out 33 chips is modulated with BOC(6,1), and the other 29
chips are modulated with BOC(1,1). Finally, the L1Cp signal has 75% of the power
in the combined L1C signal, while the L1Cd signal only has 25% of the power. The
Weil spreading code sequences used for the L1C signal are described in [15].
The time domain representation of all binary modulations on GPS L1 are shown
in Figure 2, with arbitrary randomly-generated PRN sequences.
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Figure 2. Binary Modulations on GPS L1
Modulation State Vector.
In this thesis, the Modulation State Vector (MSV) is defined as the binary com-
bination of different component signals 1 : K at a given sample n (i.e. b1[n] for the
first signal). This includes the composite of the respective spreading codes, subcar-
riers, overlay codes, and data for each signal component. In Figure 2, the MSV can
be visualized as the binary vector of the five component signals at a given sample n
(shown in green), with K = 5,
MSV [n] = [b1[n]b2[n]...bK [n]] . (6)
12
L2C Spreading Codes.
While GPS L2 Band signals are not directly addressed in this thesis, the spreading
codes used for the L2 civilian signal were used for some experiments. The L2C signal
is a combination of two codes, the civil-moderate (CM) code with a length of 10230
chips, and the civil-long (CL) code with a length of 767250 chips. When the CM and
CL codes are combined, using chip-by-chip interleaving (i.e. a CL chip followed by a
CM chip), the resulting L2C code is 1534500 chips long, much longer than the 10230
chips for L1C signals. Because of the long length, the L2C codes were used in place
of P(Y) and M codes for some experiments.
2.2 Constant Envelope Modulation
In order to optimize the power efficiency of satellite payloads, amplifiers must op-
erate at saturation. This means that the signal being amplified must have a constant
envelope to avoid distortion. That is, the amplitudes of the in-phase and quadrature
modulation components AI and AQ in (7) are equal
V (t) = AIcos(ωt+ φa(t)) + AQsin(ωt+ φb(t)). (7)
Additionally, the transmitted frequency ω cannot be modulated, since it is con-
strained to the carrier frequency. Therefore the information contained in the different
component signals must be represented in φn(t).
While modulating the signal components (C/A, L1Cp, L1Cd, P(Y), and M) onto
the carrier using linear combination
Vcomposite(t) =
K∑
k=1
vk(t) (8)
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preserves the desired receiver correlation properties, it does not result in a constant
envelope signal. Therefore, a signal combining technique is required to enable the
resulting signal to have the desired receiver correlation properties, but also maintain
a constant envelope signal in the time domain. Several different constant envelope
modulation (CEM) methods are described in the following sections.
Majority Vote.
One method to combine multiple spreading codes is Majority Vote [16]. As the
title implies, this signal combining method looks at which binary value occurs most
in a given MSV, and transmits the resulting value. Since it requires a majority
(there cannot be a tie), this signal combining method requires an odd number of
signals. The equation for this modulation technique, where bn ⊂ −1, 1 (different
representation than Equation (1)), is
φn(t) =

0, if
∑K
n=1 bn(t) > 0.
π, if
∑K
n=1 bn(t) < 0.
(9)
coherent adaptive subcarrier modulation (CASM).
Coherent Adaptive Subcarrier Modulation (CASM) is another constant envelope
signal combining method [17]. It is mathematically equivalent to Interplex, and de-
fined as
V (t) = [
√
2PIbn(t)cos(m) +
√
2PQsin(m)bs(t)ϕs(t)]cos(ωt)
+ [
√
2PQbn(t)cos(m)−
√
2PIsin(m)bs(t)ϕs(t)]sin(ωt)
(10)
where ϕs(t) is a periodic subcarrier, bs(t) is the subcarrier sequence, m is the
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modulation index in radians, PI and PQ represent the inphase and quadrature power
components. The result is that based on the value of the subcarrier bs(t), the phases
of the I and Q channels are modulated with either 0±m rad or π ±m rad.
Phase Optimized Constant Envelope Transmission (POCET).
POCET is a CEM technique described in [9] and is patented [18]. The algorithm
finds an optimal Look Up Table (LUT) given a set of constraints between the com-
ponent signals (relative power and relative phase). The MSV at a given sample is
the input to the LUT, and the resulting phase is modulated to create the constant
envelope signal.
For N signals at a given carrier frequency, 2N phase values (φK = φ0...φ2N−1) are
calculated and stored in a LUT. Therefore the resulting signal is defined as
V (t) = Acos(ωst+ φn(t)) (11)
where
φn(t) = LUTPOCET (BinaryToIndex(MSVn(t))) (12)
The POCET algorithm assumes that the MSV is uniformly distributed due to
random spreading codes, resulting in all the LUT phases equally likely to occur. As
a result, the cross-correlation of signal n of N is
Corrn =
A
2N
2N−1∑
k=0
[1− 2bn[k]]ejφk . (13)
The optimization process to find the set of φK for a given set of phase and power
relationships is described in [9].
To visualize the difference between the POCET signal combining method and
the linear combination (Sum) method, L1 Band signals as shown in Figure 2 were
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modulated using both methods. The resulting phase modulation (without the carrier)
is shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3. Phase Modulation Comparison between Phase Optimized Constant Envelope
Transmission (POCET) and Linear Combination (Sum) Modulation Methods
POCET Implementation and Receiver Testing.
Since the POCET algorithm was initially introduced, further research has been
performed. The addition of an unconstrained phantom signal with no amplitude or
phase constraints into the optimization problem provides another degree of freedom
to the solution, resulting in an optimal efficiency solution [19].
Receiver compatibility of POCET signal combining was investigated in [20]. This
paper primarily analyzes C
N0
and efficiency performance compared to other signal
combining methods. It shows that the POCET signal combining method creates the
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intended relative signal powers, but does not investigate any effects POCET might
have on high accuracy SatNav receivers.
Flex-power is the ability to dynamically change the power between different com-
ponent signals at a given carrier frequency to be able to rapidly respond to different
operational scenarios. A demonstration of flex-power enabled by POCET modula-
tion was shown in [21], which also describes the POCET algorithm implementation in
GWPP, where C
N0
levels were analyzed for different flex-power combinations. However
Code-minus-Carrier (CmC) measurements were not performed and receiver testing
was only performed on software-defined receivers.
It is stated in [22] that spreading code state distributions can cause biases. The
solution presented is to add a search criteria for PRN sequences such as to minimize
the inter-modulation products resulting in receiver biases.
None of this previous work has presented range measurements of COTS receivers
with a physically generated POCET signal. Furthermore, no CmC analysis has been
performed on software-defined receivers. The research presented in this thesis con-
tributes these previously-unknown results to the satellite navigation (SatNav) com-
munity.
2.3 SatNav Receiver Tracking
The previous sections described GPS signal generation and signal combining meth-
ods. This section describes how a SatNav receiver tracks a navigation signal, and how
distortions in signals result in measurement biases.
Correlation Receivers.
Since the received signal power of SatNav signals is well below the noise floor,
the signal cannot directly be measured or detected. Correlation receivers are used
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to coherently integrate the SatNav signals until timing information can be extracted.
The pseudorange is a measurement of the distance between a satellite and a SatNav
receiver based on the phase of the spreading code from that satellite. All pseudorange
measurements computed by the receiver contain a common clock bias error. However,
when pseudoranges are calculated from four or more different satellites, the receiver
can use Least Squares or other methods to solve for the clock error and determine
the receiver’s 3D position as well as absolute GPS Time.
For civilian signals, the PRN sequence for a given signal transmitted from a par-
ticular satellite is known to the receiver, it generates a replica of the spreading code,
and uses a search process to find the Doppler frequency and code phase of the signal
in order to acquire the signal. Once acquired, it tracks the carrier frequency of the
signal using a Phase Locked Loop (PLL).
Delay Locked Loop.
To track the code phase for a given signal, typically at least three time shifted
signal replicas are correlated with the received signal in order to steer the replica
code phase to keep it aligned with the received signal. Figure 4 shows the Early,
Prompt, and Late correlator values as they would appear on a C/A signal with
aligned code phase. The correlator spacing refers to the distance between the early
and late correlators - in this example, the early replica is shifted by 0.5 chips early
with respect to the prompt correlator, and the late replica is shifted by 0.5 chips late
with respect to the prompt correlator, resulting in a correlator spacing, D, of 1 chip.
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Figure 4. Early, Prompt, and Late Correlator Spacings
The Delay Lock Loop (DLL) used to track the spreading code phase uses the
Early-minus-Late (EmL) discriminator τ̂n, where the early correlation power for a
given integration period is Em and the late correlation power is Lm,
τ̂n =
1
2
Em − Lm
Em + Lm
. (14)
The prompt replica is used to estimate the signal strength. The resulting dis-
criminator plot for a correlator spacing of 1 chip is shown in Figure 5. Based on
the discriminator value for any given integration period, the early and late correla-
tion values are used to calculate the code phase error τ̂m, which is used to steer the
prompt replica. If the code phase error is within the linear section of the S-curve in 5
(± 1 chip), this discriminator will produce the correct code phase error measurement.
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Figure 5. S-Curve Discriminator τ̂m
For the COTS receiver measurements performed in this thesis, carrier smoothing
of the code was set to the minimum possible level for each receiver, in order to reduce
the smoothing effect which would spread out any biases in time, requiring longer
integration times to accurately determine if there are any pseudorange biases.
The correlation function is distorted by the satellite signal transmitter and receiver
front-end band limiting, delayed reflections of the signal with either constructive or
destructive interference (multipath), and ionospheric effects. The EmL discriminator
will have a bias corresponding to the distorted correlation function. Changing the
correlator spacing or adding more correlators can improve the tracking performance
in the presence of multipath [23].
Carrier Phase Measurements.
Some high accuracy receivers use carrier phase measurements based off of the
integrated Doppler measurement of the received signal, which provides another mea-
surement of the distance between the satellite and receiver by determining how many
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carrier cycles are between the satellite and the receiver.
The difference between the pseudorange measurement ρ and the carrier phase
measurement φc is known as the code minus carrier measurement (CmC), a measure
of the divergence between the code tracking and the carrier tracking. A perfect
signal, without any ionospheric affects, would have a CmC measurement of 0. Since
the carrier phase measurement is in carrier phase cycles φc, the measurement must
be scaled by the wavelength of the carrier frequency λL1 in order to get a distance
measurement in units of meters. Finally, since it is of interest how the CmC stays
constant or diverges over time, the CmC measurement is normally initialized by the
first value b[0] so that the first CmC value is 0.
CmC[n] = ρ[n]− φc[n]λL1 + CmC[0]. (15)
Carrier to Noise Density Ratio.
The received signal strength for SatNav signals is expressed in carrier to noise
density ratio C
N0
, which is defined as
C
N0
=
SignalPower
NoisePower
× (Bandwidth). (16)
2.4 Chips Message Robust Authentication (Chimera)
A next generation signal concept is chips message robust authentication (Chimera)
[1], which would provide civilian authentication capability on the GPS L1C signal to
give civilian users positive authentication that a signal is from a reliable source to
counter spoofing. To jointly authenticate the navigation message and spreading code,
Chimera punctures the spreading code with markers cryptographically generated from
a key derived from a digitally signed navigation message. The digital signature is not
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sent until after the marker sequence has been transmitted. This time-binding ensures
that a potential spoofer is unable to generate the marker sequence until after it has
been broadcast.
The key generation and transmission scheme for both the fast and slow channel
is shown in Figure 6.
Figure 6. Chimera Slow and Fast Channel Transmitter Block Diagram (From [1], Used
With Permission)
The receiver and authentication scheme is shown in Figure 7.
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Figure 7. Chimera Slow and Fast Channel Receiver Block Diagram (From [1], Used
With Permission)
The cryptographic markers are inserted into the spreading code via puncturing,
as demonstrated in Figure 8.
Figure 8. Puncturing Example (From [1], Used With Permission)
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Note that since spreading codes in general are pseudorandom and puncture se-
quences are cryptographically random, for a given puncture sequence, only half of the
punctures will result in the chip changing values. As a result, the signal correlation
loss as a function of puncturing duty cycle (DF) over an infinite-length punctured
sequence is given by [24]
Loss(dB) = (20log10(1−DF )). (17)
This correlation loss is not desirable, but it is a trade off to enable civilian signal
authentication. Alternatively the overall signal power could be boosted to compensate
for this correlation loss.
2.5 Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) Waveform Prototyping
Platform
The GNSS Waveform Prototyping Platform is a high fidelity, software-defined
SatNav signal generator developed by the Autonomy and Navigation Technology
(ANT) Center at the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) to support SatNav
software-defined payloads and signals research and receiver testing [25].
It employs direct digital synthesis (DSS) to generate SatNav signals right at radio
frequency [26]. The description of POCET as implemented in GWPP is given in [21].
The architecture is shown in Figure 9.
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Figure 9. GWPP Architecture
Code numerically controlled oscillators (NCOs) based on the chipping rates of the
different GPS L1 signals are used to create the PRN sequences and subcarriers, which
are combined to form the MSV and input to the POCET LUT. The resulting output
phase is added to the carrier NCO output. This resulting NCO phase with 64-bit
integer resolution is reconstructed with a carrier LUT, amplified and converted to an
analog signal via a digital to analog converter (DAC). The resulting analog waveform
can be attenuated to the appropriate level to provide a receiver under test with a C
N0
comparable to receiving a live-sky signal.
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III. Spreading Code Puncturing Receiver Testing
Methodology and Results
This chapter describes the test configurations and COTS receiver tracking results
of spreading code puncturing implemented with GWPP. The purpose of this is to
whether using spreading code puncturing in the Chimera civilian signal authentication
algorithm (see Section 2.4) has any negative or unforeseen effects on non-participating
current generation COTS receivers.
3.1 GWPP Puncturing Configuration
The physical set up for the spreading code puncturing test is shown in Figure 10.
Note that the COTS receivers are not driven by GWPP’s reference oscillator. This
models an operation test environment.
Figure 10. GWPP Puncturing Receiver Configuration.
3.2 COTS Receiver Parameters and Recording
The COTS receivers used for the data collection presented in this thesis were
two commercially available high accuracy receivers. They were configured to output
the following measurements at a rate of 1 Hz: C
N0
, pseudorange, carrier phase, and
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Doppler. These measurements were then recorded to disk. The delay lock loop (DLL)
code smoothing time constant was set to be the minimum allowed on each respective
receiver (2 seconds for COTS Receiver 1, 0 seconds for COTS Receiver 2). Increasing
the DLL code smoothing time constant would increase the response time of the code
tracking loop. Since the primary measurement of interest for this research is the code
minus carrier (CmC), when comparing the effects of two different signal configuration
states it is desirable to minimize transient time and achieve the steady-state response
as quickly as possible.
The amount of physical RF attenuation and the digital gain of the digital-to-
analog converter (DAC) on GWPP was adjusted to achieve a nominal C
N0
reading of
47 dB/Hz for both receivers. A nominal variation of ± 3 dB/Hz about this value was
found to be in the linear range of the C
N0
estimators for these receivers. There is a
slight difference (on the order of 0.5 dB) in C
N0
readings between the two receivers.
This is assumed to be due to different C
N0
estimators used in these receivers (i.e.
the estimators have different biases and scale factors depending on the proprietary
algorithm used in each receiver).
3.3 Repeating Puncture Sequences
While Chimera proposes implementing spreading code punctures on the L1C sig-
nal, at the time this research was performed no COTS receivers that tracked the L1C
signal had been purchased. Therefore puncturing was implemented on the legacy
C/A signal instead. Puncturing implies inserting binary chip values at certain chip
locations, regardless of the value of the spreading code chip at that location. Since
spreading codes are binary, on average puncturing N chips will result in chip inversion
of N
2
chips.
The experiments performed for this research assumed 100% chip inversion, that
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is, chips are not punctured but are inverted from their current value to their opposite
binary value. The scale factor of 2 can be used to convert analysis of 100% chip inver-
sion back to nominal puncturing with 50% chip inversion. The theoretical correlation
loss for inverting a particular duty factor (DF) of spreading code chips is given by
(17).
To test puncturing by 10% chip inversion on COTS receivers, 10% of the 1023 C/A
chips for GPS PRN 16 where chosen using MATLAB’s random number generator.
Since 1023 is not divisible by 10, 102 of the 1023 C/A chips were inverted, resulting
in an effective chip inversion of 102
1023
= 0.0997 = 9.97% ≈ 10%. This particular set
of chip values was saved to a text file. Both the normal C/A PRN 16 sequence and
the punctured PRN 16 sequence were sent to GWPP and transmitted alternatively,
each for 30 seconds duration and repeating indefinitely. Only this single PRN was
generated by GWPP with the nominal carrier frequency and code rates (i.e. no
Doppler).
Pseudorange Biases due to Repeating Puncture Sequence on C/A code.
Once GWPP started transmitting the alternating punctured/non-punctured GPS
C/A signal and both COTS receivers acquired and tracked it, measurement log-
ging on both receivers was started. Data were collected for 1 hour. Afterwards,
the data from both receivers were converted to RINEX and analyzed. The C
N0
and
pseudorange-minus-carrier phase measurement (also known as code-minus-carrer or
CmC) were plotted to reveal the receiver’s response to this signal (CmC measurements
are discussed in Section 2.3).
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Figure 11. Alternating Puncture Transitions, 10% Inversion on C/A Code, 7 Minute
Duration.
Seven minutes of data from the first test are shown in Figure 11. The C
N0
is shown
in the top portion of the figure, and CmC is shown in the bottom. COTS Receivers
1 and 2 are represented by the blue and red, respectively. This color association is
employed for the remainder of this thesis. The C
N0
drops by about 1.8 dB as expected
due to the correlation associated with 10% inversion of C/A chips. The CmC is
noisy, and does not appear to diverge. If the receivers are tracking normally, the
zero-initialized CmC should not diverge over time.
To study the CmC metric in greater detail, the 60 second periods represented
by the green regions in Figure 11 were coherently integrated across the 1 hour test
duration,
CmCint =
1
60
60∑
m=1
CmC[n+ 60(m− 1) + 15]. (18)
For the C
N0
measurement, the dB-Hz values are converted to fractions, averaged,
and then converted back to dB-Hz,
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(
C
N0
)
int
= 10
(
log10
(
1
60
60∑
m=1
10
(
C
N0
[n+60(m−1)+15]/10
)))
. (19)
Figure 12. Coherently Integrated Alternating Puncture Transitions, 1 Hour, 10% In-
version on C/A Code.
The resulting integrated CmC and C
N0
metrics are shown in Figure 12. For re-
ceiver 1, CmC appears to be mostly noise (i.e. no significant pseudorange bias can
be observed when the signal switches between the two states). However, receiver
2 does appear to induce a significant bias - on the order of 20 cm. Although a 20
cm pseudorange bias may not be critical for standalone pseudorange-only position-
ing applications, the magnitude of this error cannot be ignored for high accuracy
code-measurement-dependent applications such as differential GPS and precise point
positioning (PPP). Due to the all-digital signal synthesis scheme employed by GWPP,
it can be guaranteed by design that simple altering of the spreading code sequence (as
done for this experiment) does not delay/advance or otherwise alter the carrier syn-
thesis process. Hence the CmC bias observed by the receiver can be fully attributed
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to the code tracking process and hence a pseudorange bias.
Correlation Function Asymmetry caused by Spreading Sequence Punc-
turing.
To investigate the cause of the significant pseudorange bias on receiver 2 and not
receiver 1, and analysis of the auto and cross correlation functions between the original
and punctured C/A code sequences was performed. GPS C/A code autocorrelation
functions have 3 distinct values for time lag (in chips) τ 6= 0: 63, -1, and -65, along
with the value of 1023 at τ = 0.
Figure 13. Arbitrary 1023 Length PRN 16 Autocorrelation and Normalized Punctured
PRN 16 illustrating Asymmetry Introduced by Random-Chip Puncturing
Applying a random puncture sequence that also repeats with the spreading se-
quence alters the slopes of the correlation function, as shown in Figure 13. Since a
punctured sequence has correlation losses, the functions are normalized to the max-
imum value of 1023 for visual comparison. The error δτ is the difference between
the punctured sequence correlation function and the autocorrelation function at code
phase τ . In Figure 12 the values of δ1 and δ−1 are 87 and -43, respectively. Note
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that if the values of δ1 and δ−1 are not identical, there is a resulting asymmetry
of the correlation function. This asymmetry will cause a receiver’s early-minus-late
(EmL) discriminator to estimate the code phase of the correlation peak incorrectly
thus leading to a pseudorange bias. Figure 14 shows the output of the code discrim-
inator given by (14) with a correlator spacing of 0.1 chip for both the original and
punctured sequences.
Figure 14. EmL Discriminator Comparison Between Autocorrelation of PRN 16 and
Correlation of PRN 16 with Punctured Sequence, 0.1 Chip Correlator Spacing
From the figure it can be clearly seen that the punctured sequence induces a
pseudorange error of 0.97 meters. This error is not consistent with the error induced
in receiver 2. This can be attributed to the fact that receiver 2 may be using a
different code discriminator algorithm (including different correlator spacings) and
also because its correlation function is rounded due to band-limiting.
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Worst Case Repeating Puncture Sequence.
To investigate this phenomenon further, a Monte Carlo simulation generated 10000
different random sequences that are 1023 chips long and resulting in 10% flipped chips.
For each sequence, the correlation function values with the PRN 16 C/A sequence
at τ = −1 and 1 were evaluated and subtracted from the autocorrelation of the
PRN 16 C/A sequence, resulting in the δ1 and δ−1 measurements. A discriminator
D = |δ1 − δ−1| was used to find the sequences with a worst-case value and best-case
value. The sequence used in Figure 12 had parameters of δ1 = −2.56, δ−1 = 6.47,
D = 9.03, which represented an average case.
Figure 15. Integrated Alternating Puncture Transitions, 10% Inversion on C/A Code,
δ1 = 1.8, δ−1 = 22.99, D = 21.19.
The test shown in Figure 15 is identical to that shown in Figure 12, except the
puncture sequence used the worst case sequence, with parameter values of δ1 = 1.8,
δ−1 = 22.99, D = 21.19 Notice that the bias in the COTS Receiver 1 is about twice as
large as in Figure 12, corresponding to the larger value of D. Again, COTS Receiver
2’s pseudorange measurements appears to be unaffected by the correlation function
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slope asymmetry introduced by this puncturing sequence.
Best Case Repeating Puncture Sequence.
This test shown in Figure 16 is identical to that shown in Figure 15, except the
puncture sequence used the best case sequence, with parameter values of δ1 = 0.1,
δ−1 = 0.1, D = 0. Note that there is no distortion in the correlation function, and
as a result, the COTS Receiver 2 does not show a CmC bias corresponding to the
enabling and disabling of puncturing.
Figure 16. Integrated Alternating Puncture Transitions, 10% Inversion on C/A Code,
δ1 = 0.1, δ−1 = 0.1, D = 0.
These three tests show that for some receivers, repeating the same puncturing
sequences indefinitely causes biases proportional to the distortion of the correlation
function due to the repeating short C/A codes. Longer codes would reduce the
amount of correlation function asymmetry, but not necessarily eliminate the bias
altogether. If short sequences are repeated, the puncture locations will have to be
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selectively chosen to minimize the distortion of the correlation function, specifically
to have a D parameter value of 0 or as close to 0 as possible.
3.4 Pseudorange Bias Analysis for Randomized Spreading Code Punc-
tures
Since the Chimera algorithm punctures will be implemented on longer L1C overlay
codes, it is important to see the effect that longer codes would have on COTS receiver
biases.
Hardware Pseudo-Random Maximum Length Puncture Generation.
At the time of this research, the software defined capabilities and communication
bandwidth of GWPP were limited such that implementing a software based pseudo-
infinite puncturing sequence was not attainable, as each pseudo-random puncture
sequence would have to be generated in software and sent real-time to GWPP to
puncture the spreading code sequence.
Instead of repeating a certain C/A code puncture sequence indefinitely, a 64 bit
linear-feedback shift register (LFSR) based pseudorandom sequence was developed to
create a puncturing sequence with 10% chip inversion with length 264 which is much
longer than the 1023 chip length of the C/A code, as shown in Figure 17.
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Figure 17. Linear Feedback Shift Register Frame Diagram. Duty Factor of Each Frame
Output Is Shown in Blocks on Right.
A total of 100 64-bit LFSRs are used in the GWPP FPGA, divided into 10 frames
of 10 LFSRs each. All 100 LFSRs are initialized with a different seed and different
polynomial, so that the output of each LFSR is pseudo-random with each other. Each
LFSR outputs a pseudo-random stream of binary values of length 264, half of which
are 0 and half of which are 1.
It is important to note that this design was not optimized to reduce the hardware
footprint - there may be more efficient implementations of this algorithm that use
other independent random sequence generators other than 100 different 64-bit LF-
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SRs. This design was chosen in order to be able to generated the resulting random
punctured sequence with a given duty cycle.
To create a puncturing sequence of a particular duty factor, these random se-
quences have to be combined in a particular way. The output of each LFSR on a
given frame is logically XORed with the result of the XOR upstream as shown in
Figure 17. When two independent random binary sequences are XORed with each
other, 1
4
of the resulting sequence will be ones. This staggering method produces 10
outputs for each frame, varying in duty factor of ones from 1
2
to 1
1024
.
Figure 18. Linear Feedback Shift Register Example, 10% Desired Chip Inversion.
These outputs are then combined to make the desired duty factor as shown in
Figure 18. Outputs from as many different frames as needed are logically ORed
together to create the desired inversion duty factor (10% in this case). Each output
has to be from a different frame since when independent binary sequences are ORed
together the resulting output sequence contains the sum of the number of ones that
occur in each of the sequences independently.
To adjust the duty cycle of the punctures, the only thing that changes is which
outputs are tapped out of each frame. With 1
1024
resolution, a puncturing duty cycle
from 0% to 100% can be achieved with a resolution of 0.09765%. The final output of
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the LFSR-based puncturing sequence is then used to determine the spreading code
inversion locations. The LFSRs run at the spreading code rate, and if the output
of the LFSR-based puncturing sequence is a one, the value of the nominal spreading
code is inverted.
Receiver Pseudorange Biases for Randomized C/A Sequence Punctur-
ing.
The LFSR-based pseudo-random puncturing sequences of length 264 were imple-
mented in the GWPP as described above. The results of COTS receivers are shown
in Figure 19. Since each 1 millisecond code interval of 1023 chips has a different punc-
ture sequence, over time the correlation function averages out to the autocorrelation
function of C/A code resulting in no effective bias in the slope of the correlation func-
tion. As a result, the COTS Receiver 2 does not show a bias in the CmC. The drop
in C
N0
of 1.8 dB validates the implementation of the LFSR-based puncturing method.
Figure 19. Integrated Alternating Puncture Transitions, 10% Inversion on C/A Code
Using a 64-Bit LFSR-Based Puncturing Sequence.
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Since the LFSR design is more representative of the Chimera implementation on
long L1C overlay codes, it can be deduced that Chimera puncturing that is pseudo-
random will not cause any biases on current generation COTS receivers.
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IV. Phase Optimized Constant Envelope Transmission
Receiver Testing Methodology and Results
This chapter describes the methodology and results of the tests performed to
determine if Phase Optimized Constant Envelope Transmission (POCET) induces
biases in commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) and software-defined radio (SDR) receivers.
The theory of the POCET signal combining method is described in Chapter 2.
4.1 POCET Look-Up Table Generation
The POCET look-up table (LUT) generation was performed using pyPOCET -
a Python graphical user interface (GUI)-based application developed by Seeley Pen-
tecost. The algorithms implemented in pyPOCET are described in [21]. The input
parameters to pyPOCET are the relative power and relative phase relationships be-
tween N signals. It outputs the resulting POCET LUT with the modulated phase as
a function of the modulation state vector (MSV), the binary vector of all the signal
values at a given sample (described in Section 2.1). This includes the combined value
of spreading code symbols, sub-carriers, overlay codes symbols, data symbols, and
puncture code symbols.
To create a POCET LUT for a nominal Global Positioning System (GPS) L1
band containing five signals: coarse acquisition (C/A), L1Cp, L1Cd, Pseudo-P(Y),
and Pseudo-M, the desired power and phase relationships shown in Table 2 were given
as the input to the POCET LUT generation algorithm. Note that the relative power
value for the M signal was chosen arbitrarily, since there is no openly published power
value for this signal.
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Table 2. Input Parameters for Nominal Five-Signal GPS L1 Signal Modulation
Designation Signal Name Relative Signal Power (dB) Relative Signal Phase (deg)
C0 C/A 0 90
C1 L1Cp -3 0
C2 L1Cd 0.25 0
C3 P(Y) -4.5 0
C4 M -2.5 0
A visualization of the complex plane showing the output relative power and phase
relationships of the various component signals as a result of the POCET optimization
routine is shown in Figure 20. Table 2 shows the power levels as relative to the C/A
signal, while the pyPOCET power levels in Figure 20 are normalized so that they
sum to 0 dB. Note that the actual relative power values vary slightly from the desired
ones shown in Table 2. This is due to the optimization process - the accuracy of
the requested power values is compromised in order to minimize intermodulation
products.
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Figure 20. POCET Algorithm Output Relative Power and Phase
The resulting LUT in shown in Figure 21. For each combination of the MSV, the
resulting phase modulated onto the carrier is shown. Note that every complementary
MSV pair (00000,11111 or 00101, 11010, for examples) is 180 degrees apart.
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Figure 21. POCET Output LUT 1: (Phase as Function of the MSV)
4.2 POCET Implementation on GWPP
The POCET modulation method was implemented using the GNSS Waveform
Prototyping Platform (GWPP) by saving the LUT as a file and loading it onto hard-
ware memory. The LUT was then used to modulate the carrier at every sample,
depending on the MSV state at that sample. The MSV is the vectorization of the
N binary signal components comprised of various spreading sequences, subcarriers,
and other binary symbols depending on signal structure. The GWPP architecture as
applicable to this thesis is shown in Figure 22. With the POCET LUT block, the
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MSV is converted to a 64-bit unsigned representation of phase (where 0 represents 0
radians and 264−1 represents 2π− radians). This value is added to the carrier NCO’s
64-bit unsigned integer representation of a pure tone at the L1 frequency sampled at
fs. Further details of the GWPP architecture and implementation can be found in
[21].
The spreading codes and sub-carrier generators are combined to form the input
to the POCET LUT. After the MSV is converted to the 64-bit integer representation
of phase, the result is added to the carrier NCO output. The resulting 64-bit integer
phase modulated signal is transformed into a discrete time cosine wave using the
carrier LUT shown in Figure 22.
Figure 22. GWPP with POCET Modulation Architecture Diagram
4.3 Observed Range Biases in Receivers due to POCET Modulation
An RF signal containing the five signals available on a GPS III satellite was
generated using the POCET signal combining technique describe above. These five
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signals are C/A, L1Cp, L1Cd, P(Y), and M-code. The relative power and phase
relationships of the five signal components are shown in Table 3. Note that 1534500
chip combined L2C long and moderate spreading code sequences were used for P(Y)
and M-code since these codes are not publicly available.
A second POCET LUT was created using relative power and phase relationships
shown in Table 4. The resulting phase a function of MSV is shown in Figure 23. The
difference between the two LUT were 1.8 dB of power was taken from the C/A signal
and given to enhance the M-code signal.
Table 3. Nominal Five Signal Constellation Modulation Configuration
Signal Modulation Spreading Code PRN Power (dB) Phase (degrees)
C/A BPSK(1) C/A 16 0 90
L1Cp BOC(6,1,4/33) L1C 1 -3 0
L1Cd BOC(1,1) L1C 2 0.25 0
P(Y) BPSK(10) L2C 1 -4.5 0
M BOC(10,5) L2C 2 -2.5 0
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Table 4. Alternate Five Signal Constellation Modulation Configuration: 1.8 dB from
C/A to M
Signal Modulation Spreading Code PRN Power (dB) Phase (degrees)
C/A BPSK(1) C/A 16 -1.8 90
L1Cp BOC(6,1,4/33) L1C 1 -3 0
L1Cd BOC(1,1) L1C 2 0.25 0
P(Y) BPSK(10) L2C 1 -4.5 0
M BOC(10,5) L2C 2 -0.7 0
Figure 23. POCET Output LUT 2: (Phase as Function of the MSV)
These two different POCET tables were used, alternating every 30 seconds, re-
sulting in the signal constellation changing every 30 seconds. The GWPP output was
then connected to two well-known high precision COTS satellite navigation (SatNav)
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receivers, as described in Section 3.2. Since no COTS receivers able to track L1C
signals could be procured, the C/A signal was the only open signal that could be
used for COTS receiver testing. The receiver measurements were integrated over 1
hour, using equations (18) and (19) discussed in Chapter 3. The resulting C
N0
and
Code-minus-Carrier (CmC) plots are shown in Figure 24
Figure 24. Alternating Transitions of 1.8 dB from C/A to M Signals
The C
N0
changes as expected by 1.8 dB due to the POCET table changing every
30 seconds. However the CmC has a bias on the order of 10 cm between the two
different POCET tables. If the POCET modulation method has no effect on COTS
receivers, the CmC should remain as unbiased, zero-mean Gaussian noise. The biases
shown are not the result of the change in C
N0
, because Figures 16 and 19 show a drop
in the C
N0
of the C/A signal of 1.8 dB as a result of unbiased puncturing but do not
show a bias in CmC - therefore the bias in the CmC is due to some other phenomenon
induced solely by the POCET modulation.
Another case was tested where the C/A signal tracked by the COTS receivers was
not changed between the two POCET tables, but 4 dB of power was taken from the
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P signal and given to the M signal, as represented in Table 5. The two POCET LUTs
alternating back and forth every 30 seconds were those generated by the configuration
represented in Tables 3 and 5.
The resulting integrated receiver data is shown in Figure 25. Note that the C
N0
does change slightly between the two different POCET tables. This is due to the
POCET optimization process - the resultant power levels may not be exactly the
same as the desired power levels in order to maintain a constant envelope combined
signal. Even though there is no appreciable power level change in the C/A signal,
there is still a slight deviation between the two POCET tables.
Figure 25. Alternating Transitions of 4 dB from P to M Signals
Table 5. Alternate Five Signal Constellation Modulation Configuration: 4 dB from P
to M
Signal Modulation Spreading Code PRN Power (dB) Phase (degrees)
C/A BPSK(1) C/A 16 0 90
L1Cp BOC(6,1,4/33) L1C 1 -3 0
L1Cd BOC(1,1) L1C 2 0.25 0
P(Y) BPSK(10) L2C 1 -8.5 0
M BOC(10,5) L2C 2 1.5 0
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Even though the receivers are not tracking either the P or M signal, there still is a
CmC bias on the order of 10 cm. This further indicates that the POCET modulation
as implemented is causing a bias when tracked by COTS receivers.
As a result of these findings, numerous causes were hypothesized, and tests were
developed to evaluate these hypotheses.
4.4 POCET Table Precision
After the data collections shown above, it was found that the version of pyPOCET
used saved the LUT as single-precision floating point numbers. To determine if this
truncated precision was causing the pseudorange biases, the Python code was modified
to save the POCET LUTs as double precision numbers. Additional checks were
implemented to ensure that every complementary MSV phase pair is exactly 180
degrees apart. The impact of increasing the precision from single to double precision
was negligible, and the observed significant biases still remained.
4.5 Unbiased Range Measurements due to Long Spreading Codes
Based on the results of several experiments and troubleshooting efforts, it was
realized that the set of spreading code sequences used for the previous experiments
(C/A: 1023 chips, L1C: 10230 chips, and L2-CL+L2-CM: 1534500 chips) result in a
repeating set of MSV values. That is, all code lengths used are integer divisible by
1023. This repetition violates the underlying assumption fundamental to POCET
signal combining: that the resulting MSV combination of each signal component’s bi-
nary sequence is evenly distributed [9]. This is especially true since only the spreading
codes themselves, and no secondary modulations such as overlay code or data symbols
were used in the above experiments. These secondary modulations would introduce
additional randomness to the MSV. In an actual GPS-III signal structure, the five
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signal components, of which three have periodic spreading sequences whose lengths
are integer divisible by 1023 (i.e. C/A, L1Cp, L1Cd) also have, with the exception
of C/A, secondary code modulations and forward error corrected data that scramble
these sequences such that they are effectively random over the typical correlation
interval range of a receiver (1 to 100 ms). Hence, it would follow that such random
signal combining with POCET will not induce pseudorange biases.
To more accurately represent the effect of the actual spreading codes used in
the GPS-III L1 constellation, 64-bit Linear Feedback Shift Register (LSFR)-based
pseudo-random sequences with a length of 264 − 1 ≈ 1.844 × 1019 chips were used
to modulate the L1Cp, L1Cd, P(Y), and M-code signals, as shown in Tables 6 and
7. Different polynomials were used to create independent sequences. This results in
non-repeating, uniformly distributed MSVs representative of the actual GPS-III L1
signal constellation.
The previous experiment where 1.8 dB of power was taken from the C/A signal and
given to enhance the M-code signal was repeated, alternating between the nominal
and alternate LUTs every 30 seconds. In this case, the C/A signal used the 1023
chip C/A spreading code, while all the other signals used the 264−1 length spreading
codes. The resulting C
N0
and CmC measurements are shown in Figure 26 after 1 hour
of integration, and in Figure 27 after 8 hours of integration.
Table 6. 64-bit LFSR Nominal Five Signal Constellation Modulation Configuration
Signal Modulation Spreading Code PRN Power (dB) Phase (degrees)
C/A BPSK(1) C/A 16 0 90
L1Cp BOC(6,1,4/33) 64-bit LFSR 1 -3 0
L1Cd BOC(1,1) 64-bit LFSR 2 0.25 0
P(Y) BPSK(10) 64-bit LFSR 3 -4.5 0
M BOC(10,5) 64-bit LFSR 4 -2.5 0
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Table 7. 64-bit LFSR Alternate Five Signal Constellation Modulation Configuration:
1.8 dB from C/A to M
Signal Modulation Spreading Code PRN Power (dB) Phase (degrees)
C/A BPSK(1) C/A 16 -1.8 90
L1Cp BOC(6,1,4/33) 64-bit LFSR 1 -3 0
L1Cd BOC(1,1) 64-bit LFSR 2 0.25 0
P(Y) BPSK(10) 64-bit LFSR 3 -4.5 0
M BOC(10,5) 64-bit LFSR 4 -0.7 0
Figure 26. 64-bit LFSR Alternating Transitions of 1.8 dB from C/A to M Signals, 1
Hour Integration
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Figure 27. 64-bit LFSR Alternating Transitions of 1.8 dB from C/A to M Signals, 8
Hour Integration
It is evident that there is no CmC bias due to the POCET modulation with the
264 − 1 length spreading sequences included in the signal constellation. Therefore,
it is shown that the POCET modulation, as it would be implemented using actual
GPS L1 signals with uniform MSVs, would not result in COTS receiver biases. If
shorter, repeating MSV sequences are used in a SatNav signal configuration, there
will be range biases due to non-uniform MSV distributions.
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V. Conclusion
This chapter discusses the research impact on the satellite navigation (SatNav)
community, and suggestions for future research. This research was performed in order
to determine if next-generation signal algorithms have any negative effects on existing
commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) receivers tracking legacy Global Positioning System
(GPS) signals. The algorithms as designed to be implemented in the GPS III constel-
lation were shown to cause no pseudorange biases on several COTS receivers tested.
However, certain signal constellation configurations not representative of the GPS III
constellation (specifically short, repeating puncture sequences and combining signals
that all have short spreading codes) were shown to cause significant pseudorange
biases in the receivers tested.
This research supports next-generation satellite payload design and algorithms
including the Chips Message Robust Authentication (Chimera) civilian signal en-
cryption technique to combat spoofing, and Phase Optimized Constant Envelope
Transmission (POCET), a signal combining method to enable efficient satellite power
consumption. To accomplish this research, the GNSS Waveform Prototyping Plat-
form (GWPP) was used to generate high-fidelity GPS signals with these algorithms to
test on COTS receivers. Additionally, a variety of software-defined signal generators
and receivers were used to aid the analysis. The research goals were to:
• Perform data collections from COTS receivers tracking prototype POCET and
Chimera-enabled signals.
• Analyze this data to determine if these next generation signals have unforeseen
or negative effects on non-participating receivers.
• For any biases or effects revealed in data analysis, determine their cause(s) and
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investigate potential solutions in pursuit of demonstrating backwards compati-
bility.
Data collections were performed on COTS receivers tracking both punctured
spreading code signals and POCET-modulated GPS signals, achieving the first re-
search goal. These measurements where analyzed and further results were obtained
by using software-defined research tools.
In the case of Chimera spreading code puncturing, short, repeating puncture se-
quences were shown to cause pseudorange biases, while long, semi-infinite puncture
sequences as would be implemented with the Chimera algorithm were found to re-
sult in no pseudorange biases. Similarly, POCET was found to induce decimeter
level pseudorange biases when the modulated signals were comprised of repeating
spreading codes, including C/A, L1C, and L2C codes. However, when long 64-bit
linear-feedback shift register (LFSR)-based spreading codes were used in combination
with the C/A spreading code, no COTS receiver pseudorange biases were found. The
analysis presented of both Chimera and POCET accomplished the second research
goal.
Since spreading-code puncturing with long puncture lengths did not show any
receiver biases, this work has shown that Chimera is backwards compatible with the
several current-generation COTS receivers used for testing. A decrease in C
N0
due to
the punctures can be accounted for by either increasing the signal power or trading
the decreased C
N0
for civilian authentication capability.
The discovery of pseudorange biases induced by POCET when used in conjunction
with short, repeating codes are used presents an important design guideline when us-
ing POCET to generate certain signal constellations. If the spreading codes used for
a specific POCET modulation result in a repeating modulation state vector (MSV)
that is not uniformly distributed, pseudorange biases will occur. However, imple-
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menting POCET with 64-bit LFSR-based pseudo-random codes in combination with
the tracked C/A spreading codes show no C/A pseudorange biases apparent in COTS
receivers tested. Therefore, it can be reasoned that if POCET is implemented on the
GPS L1 signal constellation, or any other signal constellation that has a uniformly
distributed MSV (i.e., all the values of the POCET LUT are equally likely to be
accessed over the receiver integration time), no observable pseudorange biases would
occur, based on this research. While actual P(Y) and M spreading codes were not
used in this research, since they are very long codes, the resulting MSV due to the
GPS L1 signal constellation (with long military codes) is effectively non-repeating
and results in an evenly distributed MSV. With this understanding, POCET has
been shown to be backwards compatible with some existing COTS receivers, and
implementing POCET into future GPS satellite payloads will very likely not cause
negative effects on COTS receivers.
Based on the results described above, this research includes several key contribu-
tions to the SatNav community:
• The use of punctured spreading codes deemed representative of proposed future
signal upgrades were demonstrated on COTS SatNav receivers with no observ-
able biases. This research also discovered and quantified a key design criteria,
namely that long pseudo-random puncture sequences are necessary to prevent
pseudorange biases that were observed to occur with shorter length sequences.
• First published measurements of COTS Global Navigation Satellite System
(GNSS) receivers tracking a POCET-modulated signal. Decimeter-level pseu-
dorange biases were found as a result of POCET when implemented with C/A,
L1C, and L2C repeating spreading codes. These biases were shown to be a
result of an uneven MSV distribution. However, when POCET was imple-
mented with long 64-bit LFSR-based spreading codes, no pseudorange biases
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were found. This is the first published demonstration of POCET’s backwards
compatibility with COTS receivers.
It is clear that in addition to achieving the research goals, several critical con-
tributions were made to the development of the Chimera and POCET algorithms.
Based on the work presented in this thesis, topics for future research include:
• End-to-end implementation of the complete Chimera algorithm. This would
require incorporating the cryptographic marker and key generation per the
Chimera specification [24] in GWPP or a similar platform, and testing both
software-defined Chimera-enabled receivers as well as COTS non-participating
receivers. These results would validate previous theoretical performance analy-
sis and advance this technology towards maturation and deployment, providing
participating civilian GPS receivers with a positive signal and message authen-
tication to counter spoofing.
• Test spreading code puncturing and POCET on a wider array of COTS re-
ceivers, specifically those that track the L1C signal as they become available in
the market.
• Investigate the phantom signal generated by the phantom POCET method [19]
as a potential communication channel for Chimera. The extra unconstrained
signal could be modulated to contain the cryptographic watermarks. Future
work would include analyzing the performance of the POCET solution if the
phantom signal has an unconstrained phase relationship, but a constrained
power relationship. Additionally, determining if this method would be oper-
ationally feasible. For example, demonstrating that the data and bit error rates
achieved by tracking the phantom signal on actual participating receivers would
enable Chimera. Finally, measure potential effects the phantom signal has on
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the tracking of the other, non-phantom signals.
The research presented in this thesis is integral to the development of next-
generation satellite payloads and signal algorithms. Specifically, it has been shown
that puncturing spreading codes implemented with the proposed Chimera civilian
signal authentication would not cause COTS receiver pseudorange biases. Addition-
ally, POCET, when implemented as proposed in the GPS constellation, would not
result in COTS receiver pseudorange biases. Since both of these algorithms have been
shown to not cause biased measurements in several COTS SatNav receivers, future
development and implementation of these algorithms can occur with confidence that
they will not cause undesired effects on COTS receivers. This enables both civilian
and military GPS users with high precision timing and position information critical
to both United States military operations and civilian infrastructure.
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There is a desire for future GPS satellites to be software-defined to enable greater operational flexibility and adapt to a
variety of current and future threats. This includes implementing new modulation techniques such as phase optimized
constant envelope transmission (POCET) and asymmetric signal authentication methods such as chips message robust
authentication (Chimera). Any new GPS signal transmitted must be backwards compatible with the millions of receivers
already in use. This thesis shows a variety of tests performed to demonstrate the effects of Chimera and POCET-enabled
signals. It is shown through actual radio frequency signal generation, testing the response of current-generation high
accuracy commercial off-the-shelf GPS receivers to these signals, that both Chimera and POCET, as implemented in a
GPS signal constellation, are backwards compatible.
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